District Attorney's Office for Third Judicial District v. Osborne - A state prisoner has no freestanding constitutional right under the due process clause to obtain post-conviction access to forensic evidence in order to subject it to DNA testing to establish his innocence following resolution of trial and habeas proceedings. Access to DNA evidence following a final conviction is a legislative matter. 5-4 decision authored by Justice Roberts with concurrences by Alito, Kennedy and Thomas.

Gross v. FBL Financial Services Inc., - The burden of persuasion required to establish employer liability under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act is the same in cases where the employer's motives in acting against the employee are allegedly mixed as in any other ADEA action involving allegations of disparate treatment. The burden does not shift to the employer in mixed motive cases to show that it would have taken the alleged adverse action regardless of the employee's age. A 5-4 decision authored by Justice Thomas.

Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Bailey.  The terms of an injunction precluding certain lawsuits against insurers of bankrupt Johns-Manville Corp., an asbestos manufacturer, included as part of the company's 1986 bankruptcy reorganization plan, bar state-law actions brought against Manville's insurer over a decade later. The finality of the bankruptcy court's orders after direct review "generally stands in the way of challenging the enforceability of the injunction."  A 7-2 decision authored by Justice Souter.

Polar Tankers Inc v. City of Valdez-Alaska - The Court finds invalid a tax imposed by the city of Valdez on cargo ships that used its port.  A 7-2 decision.

Nijhawan v. Holder - Clarifies findings that an immigration judge must make in order for a conviction of a crime to be used as the basis for deportation.  A 9-0 decision.

Boyle v. United States - in a 7-2 decision, authored by Justice Alito, the Court defined the term "enterprise" for federal RICO statutes as the term applies to organizations that are not formal.  RICO does not apply to a loose group of criminal suspects who engage in crime together, but does apply to persons who work together in a "structure" - they have a purpose, relationship with each other, and they operate long enough to permit the pursuit of the group's purpose.

United States v. Denedo - in a 5-4 decision, authored by Justice Kennedy, the Court holds that a military court conviction that has become final can be challenged in appeal within the military judicial system by a former member of the service.

Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal - in a 5-4 decision, authored by Justice Kennedy, the Court holds that it was unconstitutional for a state supreme court justice to sit on a case involving the financial interests of a major donor to the judge's election campaign.  The Court found the contributions to be extreme.  The donor had contributed $3 million to the justice, at a time when his company was appealing a $50 million judgment.  The $3 million exceeded the contributions of all other donors combined.  The Court finds that under these circumstances, the Due Process rights of the opposing parties were violated. 

United States ex rel. Eisenstein v. New York City - in a unanimous decision, authored by Justice Thomas, the Court holds that after a federal judge rules on a private individual's claim to recover misspent federal funds, in a case in which the US government does not participate, that individual has 30 days to file an appeal.

Haywood v. Drown - in a 5-4 decision authored by Justice Stevens, the Court holds that it is unconstitutional for a state to bar all damage lawsuits brought under a federal civil rights law against prison officers or guards.  New York had allowed only a claim against the state itself in a special claims court.

Montejo v. Louisiana - In a 5-4 decision authored by Justice Scalia, the Court overrules Michigan v. Jackson concerning the rights of a criminal suspect in police custody after the appointment of counsel.

The facts:  Montejo was charged with first degree murder and the court ordered the appointment of counsel during a 72-hour hearing.  Later that day, the police read Montejo his rights under Miranda v. Arizona and he agreed to go along on a trip to locate the murder weapon.  During the trip he wrote an inculpatory letter of apology to the victim's widow.  After returning from the trip, he met his court appointed attorney for the first time.  Counsel objected to admission of the letter at trial, but it was admitted and Montejo was convicted.

The Court holds that stare decisis does not preclude reconsideration of Michigan v. Jackson.  The Court finds that Edwards v. Arizona provides enough protection for suspects who want to invoke their Miranda rights and that Jackson is not necessary to protect a defendant's rights.  The Court holds that a defendant has the right to waive his Sixth Amendment rights and that counsel need not be present or consulted when a client elects to waive those rights by speaking with the police after counsel has been appointed.  "Edwards and Jackson are meant to prevent police from badgering defendants into changing their minds about their rights, but a defendant who never asked for counsel has not yet made up his mind in the first instance."  The Court acknowledges that Miranda and Edwards guarantee Fifth Amendment rights, not Sixth Amendment rights, and apply only if the suspect is in custody, but find that Sixth Amendment rights for suspects not in custody are unnecessary because "when a defendant is not in custody, he is in control, and need only shut his door or walk away to avoid police badgering."

As for Nevada, the Court has cited to Michigan v. Jackson in two opinions but has not indicated whether it found the rule established in Jackson to be sound. The Court could hold that the protections provided for by Jackson should be recognized by our state constitution.

I initially thought that the quick fix here is for counsel to consult with the client and invoke the right to counsel at the first court appearance for all interrogations and interactions with the police or other state agents.  Such action should guarantee that the client receives the assistance of counsel at every stage of the proceedings, including questioning by police officers.  After a long, and good, discussion with Chip Siegel, I'm not sure that my initially thought on a remedy was correct.  It may be that the client will have to invoke the right to counsel at the time of the interrogation and that a blanket waiver during the first court appearance will not be sufficient, although it probably wouldn't hurt either.  Advice to the client is therefore critical in making sure that he is not interrogated by officers following the appointment of counsel.  I'll keep an eye our for analysis by others following this issue.