Harmful Error

Hidalgo v. District Court - The Nevada Supreme Court has issued a new opinion based upon the State's petition for rehearing. The Court affirms its prior opinion insofar as it held that solicitation to commit murder is not a felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person of another within the meaning of NRS 200.033(2)(b), and as it held that the State's notice of intent to seek the death penalty did not satisfy the requirements of SCR 250(4)(c) because it was vague and uncertain as to the aggravating circumstance of pecuniary gain. The Court, however, modified its prior opinion in this matter by concluding that the State should be allowed to amend its notice of intent to seek the death penalty with respect to the pecuniary gain aggravator.

Dutchess Bus. Servs. v. State, Bd. of Pharm. "In this case, two pharmaceutical wholesalers appeal from the district court's denial of a petition for judicial review of an order by respondent Nevada State Board of Pharmacy revoking the wholesalers' licenses for violations of Nevada's statutes and regulations governing the secondary prescription drug market. After a disciplinary hearing, the Board found that appellants Dutchess Business Services, Inc., and its successor company, Legend Pharmaceuticals, Inc., violated numerous sections of the Nevada Revised Statutes and the Nevada Administrative Code; therefore, the Board revoked Dutchess's and Legend's wholesaler's licenses and imposed fines on the entities. Dutchess and Legend appeal on multiple grounds, three of which raise issues of first impression.
. . . . Concerning an administrative agency's discretion to decide joinder and discovery issues during an administrative proceeding, we conclude that in the absence of a rule, statute, or regulation governing the type of proceeding before the agency, issues such as joinder and discovery are generally left to the agency's discretion. With regard to determining liability under NRS 585.520(1), because the plain language of that statute does not require intent for its violation, we conclude that the Board may find that a licensee violated NRS 585.520(1) without proving a licensee’s intent to cause harm or violate the statute. After addressing those issues, we resolve Dutchess's and Legend's remaining contentions."

Federal Ins. v. Am. Hardware Mut. Ins. - "The United States District Court for the District of Nevada has certified, under NRAP 5, the following question to this court: '[w]hether, under Nevada law, an additional insured endorsement provides coverage for an injury caused by the sole independent negligence of the additional insured?' We answer the question in the affirmative and conclude that, unless the contrary intent is demonstrated by specific language excluding or limiting coverage for injuries caused by the additional insured's independent negligent acts, there is coverage."

Mayfield v. Koroghi - "This case concerns a contract for the sale of Henderson, Nevada, real property. Under the contract, the close of escrow was conditioned on the buyer obtaining commercial subdivision approval with respect to the land. After the parties worked unsuccessfully for approximately three years to obtain the commercial subdivision approval, the sellers, without any warning to the buyer, repudiated the contract and refused to consummate the sale. In the ensuing action instituted by the buyer against the sellers and his real estate agent, who ultimately settled with the buyer, the district court granted specific performance to the buyer and awarded him costs.
In this appeal, we consider whether a party's performance under a contract must be completed within a certain time when the contract's terms do not make the time for the party's performance of the essence. We conclude that when a contract does not make the time for a party's performance of the essence, either party can make it so by setting a reasonable time for performance and notifying the other party of an intention to abandon the contract if it is not performed within that time. Further, absent such a demand for performance, or a term making time of the essence, a contract must be performed within a reasonable time. What constitutes a reasonable time for a contract's performance is a question of fact to be determined based on the nature of the contract and the circumstances surrounding its making."
There's more . . . something about costs and apportionment.

Law Offices of Barry Levinson v. Milko - "in these consolidated workers' compensation matters, we first consider whether to reexamine our long-standing jurisprudence concerning the interpretations of 'accident' and 'injury,' in light of the neutrality now required when construing the NIIA. We also consider what evidence is required to rebut the statutory presumption that arises when a claimant files a notice of injury after the claimant's employment is terminated.
We conclude that the neutrality rule does not require us to overturn 25 years of precedent regarding the construction of 'accident' and 'injury.' We further conclude, after examining the legislative history, that to rebut the presumption that arises when a claimant files a notice of injury after termination, the claimant must prove that the injury did not arise from an event that occurred after termination. Given our enunciation of this standard for rebutting the statutory presumption, we ultimately reverse a district court order denying a petition for judicial review and remand that matter so that the appeals officer may revisit the issue of whether the claimant rebutted the presumption and demonstrated that she is entitled to workers' compensation under the standard articulated in this opinion."